Introduction 1
The lexical item had better ~ 'd better ~ better has been on the fringes of the modal verb system for a long time. For brevity we will refer to the verb in its various forms as BETTER.
2 Its history has not been widely discussed, nor has great attention been paid to its PDE behaviour (though note here Mitchell (2003) , which we have found valuable). However, both its form history and its semantics are interesting and intricate, and the latter in particular call into question some familiar assumptions about modality and about semantic and pragmatic change. We will not give much space to the question of whether -or to what extent -BETTER belongs to the category Modal, although we will frequently look at its behaviour, distributionally and semantically, in terms that would be appropriate for a modal verb. Our main goal is to throw light on its semantic history in section 3, then to trace the growth of interpersonal usage in section 4. A necessary preliminary in section 2 is to trace the morphosyntactic history -in part to justify classing BETTER as a verb at all. A brief afterword forms section 5.
Form history

Present-day English grouping
In PDE BETTER seems to belong to a group of phrasal items of similar shape. Consider:
(1) a. I'd better get a takeaway. b.
I'd rather get a takeaway. c.
I'd sooner get a takeaway.
These three items are lumped together by Quirk et al. among the 'modal idioms' (1985: 137, 141-3) , and by OED s.v. have v. 22a. All three have as their (original) lexical core an item in the comparative which is adjectival Denison, David & Alison Cort. in press . Better as a verb. In Hubert Cuyckens, Kristin Davidse & Lieven Vandelanotte (eds.), Subjectification, intersubjectification and grammaticalization (Topics in English Linguistics). Mouton de Gruyter.
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or adverbial or sometimes indeterminately either, used with a light or auxiliary verb and complemented, in the constructions which are of interest to us, by a clausal element. They look similar in form and show some -but only some -similarities of meaning as well. As for the typical modal semantics of obligation, volition and necessity, BETTER would appear to approach an obligation or necessity sense, though its actual meaning is closer to advisability (see section 3.4 below). With had/would rather and had/would sooner there is more of a sense of preference, which is related to volition. However, OED gives 'preference or comparative desirability' as the general sense of all these idioms and more.
Basic construction types
To what extent can a common history be attached to the set of lexemes and constructions exemplified in (1)a-c? Part of their interest lies in the trading relationship between A/Adv and the verbally conjugated item. With BET-TER, the verb at the outset was BE, whereas in the earliest (and still surviving) pattern for the other two, it was the originally volitional would:
(2) NP subj would A/Adv + clause Subsequently with those two, had and occasionally shall or should became alternatives to would as the verbal element. For a detailed account, see Hall (1881) . 3 BETTER clearly has a different beginning. The items which do resemble BETTER to begin with are patterns involving lever, the comparative of lief 'agreeable', no longer in use. In medieval times the lever constructions were far commoner than BETTER and can therefore be used with caution to fill out details of the early history of BET-TER. The history of BETTER (and lever) in OED and elsewhere involves the following patterns: (3) (h)it is A + clause (4) NP obl is A + clause (5) NP subj be A + clause (6) NP subj have A/Adv + clause Pattern (4) is the oldest involving a referential NP as argument, while (6) is the ModE one, but what is the status of (5)? An example of (5) (with trivial word order difference) is: OED changes its mind as to the history of this phase, stating s.v. better a. and adv. A.4b that the dative pronoun of (4) 'was subsequently changed into the nominative' of (5), then '[f]inally this was given up for the current' (6). An alternative account appears s.v. have v. B.22c: that (5) only arose out of the confusion between (4) and (6), along with another and clearly blended form, (9). The dates of appearance of (5) and (6) are too close to decide the issue, as we will see below.
We have expressed the patterns (3)-(6) in formulaic terms. NP has human reference and is often pronominal, 4 so that even after the loss of OE case, an oblique-case NP obl can usually be discriminated from a subjective NP subj . Pattern (3) as formulated lacks NP altogether; we have not come across examples with an oblique NP, though from ME onwards such an NP can occur in a for-phrase. A/Adv can be lief, leofre /lever, levest, bet, better, best, selest, well; 5 comparative forms are the most common, superlative less so, while the positive forms are typically used with as. Clause can be a that-clause, contact clause, to-infinitive or plain infinitive, though with the advent of forms with HAVE in (6), only infinitival clauses are used.
One piece of evidence which supports the first of OED's accounts -of a sequential development (4) > (5) > (6) -is a stage (4)′:
The NP is singular and of indeterminate case, while the verb inflection is 3 sg, so that it is unclear whether the NP is subject or oblique. Pattern (4)′ can be regarded as intermediate between (4) Visser (1963-73: i 33-4) , who refers to van der Gaaf (1904) . In fact, on the rather modest evidence that Visser gives, 6 (9) appears at much the same date as (6), so it is unclear whether the development was (5) > (6), or (4) > (9) > (6). The dating of lever constructions tends to support the former, but rather brings in a blended (9) construction well before (6).
Another problem is the use of such patterns as me/I had been better + clause. Visser lists them (plus some irrelevant examples) separately from those with tensed BE (1963-73: i 34) . Conceivably the HAVE form in such patterns could be regarded as the principal verbal item and hence parallel to HAVE in (9) or (6), respectively. The impression is reinforced by examples like (11): this looks very much like pattern (6) with a superfluous been. In time, anyway, the inflected verb becomes confined to past tense had. In turn the form had is increasingly often reduced to 'd and finally to zero. In the layering which is typical of a grammaticalisation process, all three forms continue to co-exist.
To judge from the evidence of OED, MED and Visser (1963-73) , date ranges are approximately as shown in Table 1 , though the dates quoted are no more than indicative. It is clear that in some of its early history BETTER patterns with lever, while later it partly resembles rather. It is of course typical of auxiliaries not to impose any subject selection.
Constraints on expressed subject
There is no absolute restriction on the kinds of NP found with BETTER either. A range is illustrated in (22)- (25) However, one kind of subject is very strongly favoured with BETTER: pronoun subjects. BETTER has a markedly higher level of subject pronouns than the semantically similar modals should and ought to, for instance. In Cort's dataset, while should has a pronominal subject just over 40% of the time and ought to roughly 50%, with BETTER nearly 82% of examples have pronouns as subject; see Table 2 . Particularly prominent are first and second person pronouns, which between them account for more than 70% of all instances. The predominance of first and second person is actually even higher than that, since -as we shall shortly see in section 2.5.3 -a further 13% of BETTER examples lack an expressed subject, and such examples are nearly all implicitly first or second person. The subject NPs illustrated in (22)- (25), fully grammatical though they are, are actually rather exceptional statistically. (27)- (30), it is highly infrequent in the corpus data collected by Cort (2006); see Table 3 .
(27) Leiter turned at the door. 'Take it easy, James. Be back in an hour and we'll go and get ourselves a good dinner. I'll find out where they've taken Tingaling and we'll mail the dough to him there. Might cheer him up a bit, the poor little bastard. (ARCHER 1956flem.f8b) (28) 7 P.M. Sits with its head down, engaged in picking at imaginary objects in front of it. Can find its way in and out of its cage when roused to action. (ARCHER 1873ferr.s6b) (29)
Mary and I stood by here for the call on December 30th and 31st but it didn't come through. The relative rarity of clipped structures with these modals, never rising above a fraction of one per cent of occurrences, contrasts quite dramatically with BETTER, where clipped constructions account for a significant proportion of the data -between 10 and 20% in all but one of the corpora; see Table 4 . 
Proverbs
The unusually high level of clipped structures with modal BETTER calls to mind some familiar proverbial patterns that begin with better:
Better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all. (32) Better sit still than rise and fall. (33) Better the devil you know than the devil you don't.
This type of proverb, with or without initial clipping, derives from (3) 
Influence of proverbial patterns on BETTER
Crucial for our purposes is the pattern illustrated by (43)- (44), which could also be formulated as a variant of (49) Better + Vinf + X Notice that (49) can arise in two ways: by ellipsis of it is in proverbs, and by ellipsis of NP had before modal BETTER. Which came first? As we have seen, clipped proverbs are already attested in the seventeenth century, and in the specific form of (49) by the early eighteenth century; see (40) and (42)- (48) This at least lends support to the idea of interaction between proverb structures and the general history of BETTER.
Counterfactuals
There is one other formal property to be discussed, one of the standard tests for modalhood. Can BETTER be used as first verb in the apodosis of a past unreal conditional? Huddleston (1980, … it would have been better for him to leave politics.
We will return in section 3.7 below to the PDE unsuitability of BETTER for counterfactuals.
Summary of form history
Putting together the history discussed so far, the main stages are as follows: We can suggest some probable correlations between morphosyntax and semantics whereby transitions between the main stages in the form history correspond to differences of meaning: In OE and as long as oblique human NPs are allowed in ME, we can say that the human NP and (h)it are in complementary distribution. The oblique NP is an optional element, and when it does occur, it has a meaning standardly encoded as dative, namely beneficiary. The meaning of the predicate BE better is essentially evaluative. However, we have not found a convincing line of argument to associate a particular semantics with either the NP or the predicate in the NP subject pattern, (61) -merely that the NP is likely to be an argument of the lower verb and optionally of BETTER as well. Once the BETTER construction comes on the scene, always with a subject NP of human reference -(63) and later types -the meaning can become deontic. Finally, when non-human subjects become available, the meaning can become epistemic. As will be discussed below, the availability of first deontic and then epistemic meanings does not entail that such meanings are necessarily present.
Immediacy and specificity
Dictionary evidence suggests that infinitives with BETTER have always been predominantly plain rather than to-infinitives. However, there have certainly been examples with to. Recent scholars (Duffley 1992 , Fischer 1993 , 2000 have argued that to-infinitives in general encode a tense domain separate from that of the higher verb, whereas plain infinitives do not. It is possible, therefore, that the now-categorial selection of plain infinitives is associated with a temporal coincidence of BETTER and the lower verb, which may help to explain the sense of immediacy of the advice that we detect in BETTER, as well as the specificity which has been observed, typically 'a recommendation for a specific occasion' (Westney 1995: 182); Mitchell too shows how BETTER is appropriate for advice on a particular occasion rather than in general or habitual situations (2003: 141).
Person
We must try to account for the extraordinary predominance with BETTER of first and second person subjects, explicit and implicit (section 2.5.2). First and second person pronouns are top of the animacy hierarchy (Silverstein 1976 , Traugott & Dasher 2002 , but why should NPs lower down the scale appear so infrequently? Keith Mitchell claims that BETTER is used not only to impart advice favoured by a speaker but to 'imply that the speaker is also deciding that the advice should be acted upon ' (2003: 143) . In connection with the association of BETTER with specific reference, Westney mentions a (consequent?) expectation of fulfilment (1995: 182). If we put these semantic-pragmatic traits together -speaker decision, specific occasion, expectation of fulfilment -then it does not seem surprising that BETTER should be associated overwhelmingly with the actual participants in the speech situation, namely first and second person: they represent the most likely effective scope of a speaker's advice/decision on some immediate event. (It is interesting that examples with third person subjects often do not refer to a specific occasion; see those cited in section 3.4.2 below.)
The properties discussed in this and the previous section range over semantics, pragmatics and morphosyntax. Some represent statistical tendencies, others have become categorical. Rather than trying to tease out a neat causal chain in which property X leads to Y leads to Z, it seems better to regard this as an instance of pattern-strengthening in which the whole constellation of mutually reinforcing properties gradually coheres around the constructional idiom involving BETTER.
Deontic meaning
Advisability
BETTER is often used to express the weakly deontic function of advisability, a concept discussed by Traugott & Dasher: 'It includes the sense that action sought of the subject is not only normatively wished for but is also beneficial to the subject … ' (2002: 106) . Although their example involves modal OUGHT, it seems fully applicable to BETTER, except that historically the order should be reversed for BETTER: the action sought is beneficial to the subject and is also wished for by the speaker. The latter starts off as a generalised invited inference from the former, one that is particularly salient in the frequent early use of better constructions in conditional or even counterfactual contexts: why mention that you think it better for the subject that they should do/should have done something unless you wish them to do it/wish they had done it? Over time the element of speaker's wish becomes semanticised.
Third-person subjects
The subjects of deontic advice expressed using BETTER are mostly first or second person, therefore personal by definition, but third person subjects are found too. A third person subject does not in itself rule out deontic meaning. To see this, consider a classic case of unequivocal deontic use, MUST with a second person subject, as in (68)a: (68) a. You must repay the debt within six months. b.
The debt must be repaid within six months.
c. The borrower must repay the debt within six months.
The meaning remains essentially the same, hence deontic, even if the sentence is passivised or given a human third person subject. Now BETTER, like MUST, is voice-neutral, so the same relationship holds between the a and b sentences in (69):
(69) a. You had better repay the debt within six months. b.
The debt had better be repaid within six months. c.
The borrower had better repay the debt within six months.
And both (69) In examples (70) and (71), both somewhat archaic, the writer gives advice, enjoins someone unspecified (the reader, people in general) to act in a certain way. In (72) we have free indirect speech, and the recipient of the advice is the speaker/thinker himself: this is speaker decision. All three are deontic. We are arguing, therefore, that deontic meaning is possible even if a human recipient of advice or direction is not actually expressed, so long as one can be inferred.
Comparison
Up to late ModE, BETTER in the form had better could be used, albeit rarely, with a than-phrase of comparison:
(73) = (17) 1613 SHAKES. Hen. VIII, V. iii. 132 He had better starue Then but once thinke his place becomes thee not.
As we have seen, this possibility no longer exists. Mitchell regards this as confirmation that the meaning of BETTER now extends beyond the pure giving of advice to directing the behaviour of others or announcing decisions about one's own. 'In other words, here the deciding function overrides the comparative advantage element in the meaning … ' (2003: 143) . Directing others is more strongly deontic than advising them.
Semantics of proverbs
The proverbial patterns of section 2.5.4 involve advice-giving, like BET-TER. Unlike BETTER, the proverbs offer general (generic?) advice (i.e. what is commonly/historically held to be true) and need not reflect the opinion of the speaker. They do not convey any element of decision, any real expectation that the advice will be acted upon, any sense of immediacy. They are not, or barely, deontic. The interpersonal element is low.
Epistemic meaning
Scholars routinely distinguish deontic and epistemic modality, as in John must be stuck in traffic.
respectively. Here is Coates's definition of epistemic modality:
It is concerned with the speaker's assumptions or assessment of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker's confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed. (1983: 18) Westney denies flatly that BETTER can be used epistemically (1995: 181 and 183 note 12), while Mitchell asserts that it can (2003: 145-6 (78) ["It was here. I haven't made it up.] I swear the bodies are somewhere near here." "They had better be," Goreng said.
["Or there will be new ones."] (BNC H9N288)
All three come from fiction (imaginative prose). Mitchell correctly guesses the context of (76) and asserts that the speaker expresses the hope that it is an important matter (and an alternative utterance in this context would be I hope it's important).
He claims that of the three, (76) and (77) at least 'are resistant to a deontic interpretation ' (2003: 145) ; (77) and (78) are not otherwise discussed. He goes on to cite Givón (1994: 280) and Palmer (2001: 134) in support of the claim that hope is an epistemic illocutionary act, an instance of epistemic volition. We have some difficulty in accepting all of these claims. Would I hope it's important really have served as an alternative to It had better be important, and can the claimed absence of deontic meaning be sustained? Epistemic volition is a possible characterisation of that part of the meaning of BETTER concerned with the truth of the proposition ('I wish it were true / I wish it to be true'), 9 but it fails to capture that part of the meaning in which the speaker not so much comments on the truth of a proposition as actually tries to influence events (if only counterfactually) by impressing a course of action on a participant or imposing an obligation.
One interpretation is that all three of (76)- (78) incorporate simultaneously an epistemic and a deontic element. (We assume here that the kinds of modality available in English range over those discussed by Palmer (1979) .) The epistemic component is certainly akin to hope, while the deontic element involves the imposition of an obligation by the speaker/thinker. The meaning of (76) is difficult to paraphrase precisely, but it does seem to be rather more than merely 'I hope it's important'. We detect in addition two linked meanings: that someone (here the addressee) is in some way responsible for the situation, and that that person should endeavour -or should have endeavoured -to produce a favourable outcome (plus perhaps the suggestion that they will suffer adverse consequences otherwise). With hope there are no such additional meanings. Much the same analysis holds for (78). As for (77), the emphatic repetition (not given by Mitchell) makes the writer seem more vehement: someone is responsible, probably the housewife who had previously made sexual advances, or perhaps the writer himself, or both.
It is generally taken for granted in the literature that deontic and epistemic modalities are mutually exclusive, which may explain both Westney's position (if he thinks deontic meaning is always present with BET-TER) and Mitchell's (who argues from an apparent absence of deontic meaning in certain examples). Some scholars do acknowledge the existence of modal verb examples which are either equivocal or ambiguous between these two kinds of modality - Coates (1983) is a notable case in point -but I am not aware of analyses that attribute both deontic and epistemic modality to the same sentence without either ambiguity or vagueness. I see no reason why they should not coexist. Some scholars operate with a much wider armoury of modalities: buletic, doxastic, and so on. Again, I see no particular advantage in this case in assigning modalities to a more fine-grained classification. Better insight may be gained by invoking the concept of intersubjectivity; see section 4.
Keith Mitchell has drawn my attention to a more recent discussion of modality of his, where the following tabulation occurs: It seems to me that the BETTER clause of (76) is both directive and speculative. The speaker is doing two things at once: imposing a retrospective 22 obligation on a speech participant, and at the same time making a judgement about the truth of the proposition.
3.6. 'Threat' or other additional meanings Does BETTER encode a threat of adverse consequences if the speaker's recommendation is not followed by the second or third person addressee?
The possibility has been canvassed in the literature, and the idea was apparently salient for one group of ordinary speakers whose invented examples of sentences with BETTER tended to include a threat element. 10 Examples involving an explicit or implicit threat do indeed occur, as in the corpus examples (79)- (82): (79) I saved out that lunch money and they took it. And one of them push him down and tell him he better get some protection for himself." (Frown L12:28) (80) "You'd better not show your face back here, unless you want me to work on it with a razor." (LOB L10:112) (81) "You see, Mr. Tisdal, you had better behave peaceably," said Garrett. "There is nothing to be gained by violence. We are protected, and you in every way in our power -[…] and I tell you fairly, that, except with my permission, you shall not leave this room alive. (ARCHER 1847lefa.f5b) (82)
As a matter of fact, Grandpa better fork over some dough and pretty fast or I'm going to make his little Sarah into a shiksa.
(ARCHER 1964gelb.d8a)
But they are not frequent, amounting to just a handful in the smaller corpora and the BNC sample. (There is an analogy here with the deontic permission sense of MAY, which is perceived as more prototypical than epistemic uses despite its comparatively low frequency of occurrence.) More important, any sense of threat with BETTER is either encoded elsewhere in the linguistic context or is merely a pragmatic implication in a situational context where menace is to be expected; see here Westney (1995: 183-4) , Mitchell (2003: 146) . Threat is not inherently part of the semantics of BET-TER.
Examples like (82) are reminiscent of the so-called pseudo-conditional, in which an imperative clause X is coordinated with a declarative clause Y, roughly equivalent to protasis and apodosis of a conditional sentence, and with Y usually representing an adverse consequence for the addressee: To a certain extent the BETTER construction is equivalent to a hedged version of such an imperative clause, but it is far less grammaticalised in this role: with BETTER the consequence need not be stated, and there is no equivalent to (84) (where the imperative actually conveys 'don't scream', the converse of its literal meaning outside the pseudo-conditional construction).
If threat is not part of the semantics of BETTER, are there nevertheless additional shades of meaning in the pragmatics? If so, they must be tested against definitions of various kinds of implicature. Consider the clause it had better be important of (76). Suppose this conveys additional meanings something like the following (the first two are perhaps more convincing): (85) a. You should have made sure that the information is impor tant. b. I hold you responsible. c. If the information turns out not to be important, you will suffer adverse consequences.
Are such meanings defeasible or detachable? (Huang 2007 : 32-5, Levinson 1983 .) I believe that (85)c and probably b are defeasible, while (85)a is not and so cannot be an implicature:
(86) a. !It had better be important, but you were under no obligation to make sure. b. It had better be important, but I guess you can't know whether it is. c. It had better be important, but you won't suffer if you made an honest mistake.
The continuation shown in (86)a does not seem felicitous. It is harder to test whether the meanings of (85) are detachable -not specifically linked to the linguistic form of (76) -because it is so hard to find a good synonym for BETTER. Consider these possible paraphrases:
(87) a. It would be advantageous for it to be important. b. I hope that it is important.
If either of (87)a,b is close to synonymy with the BETTER clause of (76), then in my judgement it carries no additional implicatures or entailments, but the additional meanings (85) are lost, from which it apparently follows that (85)b,c cannot be conversational implicatures. But not only is the test of detachability problematic (Levinson 1983: 119-20) , the supposed synonymy of (87) with (76) (93) He declares that he has come to prevent Charity from getting into trouble, or to help her evoke a marriage proposal from Lucius, but he concludes the episode by saying in front of Lucius that Charity is a promiscuous "woman of the town" just like her mother. "I went to save her from the kind of life her mother was leading -but I'd better have left her in the kennel she came from" (91) is not quite the same as (92)-(94). All four express a present-time speaker comment on the past, but only (91) contains a small element of direct (albeit belated) advice from speaker to hearer and can be analysed as -just about -deontic. In (92)- (94), instead of advising a second person subject of BETTER, the speaker expresses a preference towards the proposition. And this looks very much like epistemic use, defined as follows by Mitchell:
[t]he speaker expresses a volitional attitude (a desire, a preference) towards a proposition that is potentially true: "I would like/prefer it to be the case that p". Hoping is a type of epistemic volition: a wish that a proposition whose truth is unknown turns out to be true. (2003: 145) In these counterfactual cases, however, what is being expressed is a volitional attitude with a converse formulation: a wish that a proposition whose untruth is known might turn out to be true. Notice, though, that these particular epistemic uses have almost disappeared from current English.
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Note too that BETTER historically involves or derives from a past tense form, yet its gravitation away from counterfactuals and unreal conditionals towards present and future open conditionals suggests that it fits a generalisation about obligation modals (apart from HAVE to) losing their productive morphological past-nonpast pairing and developing a "hypothetical present" with past form (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 108, 132-7) . Traugott & Dasher take the appearance of the have-perfect after a modal (must, in their discussion) as unambiguous demonstration that the modal 'was no longer understood as marked for past tense ' (2002: 137) . If the inference is safe, then the same should hold of BETTER from the fifteenth or sixteenth century iff it is a modal: But it is the combination of BETTER and predicate which carries the discourse function: the function of BETTER alone is almost purely one of deciding, with perhaps sufficient connotation of 'advice to self' to be regarded as deontic. It is very doubtful, therefore, that BETTER by itself can be considered a discourse marker.
Subjectivity and intersubjectivity
Evaluation is inherent in the meaning both of the adjective/adverb better and of the verbal BETTER, hence an element of subjectivity is necessarily involved in their use. Many early examples of the non-verbal better involve third person NPs and express the speaker/writer's evaluation of a situation and no more. (There is, however, no epistemic element, since the evaluation is part of the propositional content; cf. here also Westney (1995: 183 n.12).) Although pronominal NPs have always been predominant, it is not clear whether first and second person had such an overwhelming preponderance as they now do: we have not undertaken a corpus count of earlier material, and in any event, first and second person pronouns might well be under-represented in the text types available. Counterfactual uses, which were once common, are perhaps somewhat more strongly subjective, since they involve both the projection of an imaginary outcome by the speaker/writer and its evaluation, while proverbial uses are weaker.
In section 3.6 we discussed a group of examples which seemed to convey at one and the same time both deontic and epistemic semantics. An alternative account would bring in intersubjectivity. We repeat (88) and (89) Where (88)a and (89)a,b are epistemic and subjective, (88)b is intersubjective and epistemic/deontic: the speaker/writer projects the hope onto the addressee as well ('you too should hope for a favourable outcome'). It looks as if a cluster of properties is lost at much the same time in late ModE: complementation by a to-infinitive, inclusion of a comparison, and the possibility of counterfactual meaning (see sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6 above). The meaning of advisability comes to the fore and with it an intersubjective element: the speaker/writer doesn't just express an opinion but attempts to co-opt the hearer/reader into accepting the advice. (Note that the 'hearer' and speaker may be the same individual, since first person use is semantically reflexive). The greater the degree of speaker decision, the stronger the interpersonal element. Likewise, any invited inferences involving a second person subject, whether of being held responsible or even of being at risk of adverse consequences for non-compliance, suggest a great degree of intersubjectivity.
The preceding paragraphs rather suggest a steady diachronic progression from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, thus in Traugott's terms (this volume), a process of intersubjectification. However, there is another line of development which need not involve interpersonal use and therefore need not contribute to intersubjectification. This is the diachronic development of modality from deontic to epistemic, especially in connection with inanimate and dummy NP subjects. After all, a natural interpretation of the syntax-semantics interface is to assume that deontic modality requires a two-place verb, where the person on whom the obligation falls is one argument (and a proposition the other). Intersubjectivity arises because of the involvement of the speaker not as a syntactic argument but pragmatically. An epistemic modal is a one-place verb, taking only a proposition as argument and involving the speaker's perspective pragmatically: the perspective of the hearer does not have to be addressed by the speaker, hence intersubjectivity is low or absent altogether.
Afterword
In the course of a history that lasts at least 1200 years, the BETTER constructions have exhibited various attributes of grammaticalisation, and in particular a growth of interpersonal usage that is reflected in their semantics and in their selective preference for first and second person subjects. There is a typical chronological priority of deontic before epistemic use with inanimate or dummy subjects, just as if BETTER was (or was becoming) a full-blown modal. 13 We have not detected, however, an inevitable and unidirectional change towards pure modalhood. For one thing, BETTER is probably older than the morphosyntactic category Modal. For another, the category is a moving target -but that is another story. 
